University of Florida Levin College of Law

UF Law Scholarship Repository
UF Law Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2018

The Immigration-Welfare Nexus in a New Era?
Andrew Hammond
University of Florida Levin College of Law, hammond@law.ufl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub
Part of the Immigration Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Andrew Hammond, The Immigration-Welfare Nexus in a New Era?, 22 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 501 (2018)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UF Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in UF Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UF
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

LCB_22_2_Article_6_Hammond (Do Not Delete)

8/28/2018 9:21 AM

THE IMMIGRATION-WELFARE NEXUS IN A NEW ERA?
by
Andrew Hammond*
The Trump Administration’s immigration policy is one of the most hotly
contested areas of American law. However, few have explored the
Administration’s interest in using the obscure doctrine of public charge to
further its agenda. Public charge determinations allow immigration
authorities to prevent individuals from entering the country as well as
deport immigrants who use public benefits. What’s more, individuals
who sponsor family members to enter the United States are liable to pay
the federal government back for any public benefits the sponsored family
member uses once in the United States. A leaked draft Executive Order
and proposed regulations suggest that the Trump Administration plans
to use this obscure nexus of alienage law and public benefits regulations
in support of its agenda and pit immigrant communities and families
against each other.
This Article sketches the intersection of immigration law and the law of
public benefits. It begins by mapping the unpredictable landscape of
noncitizen eligibility for public benefits. The Article then analyzes public
charge doctrine and the ways in which the Trump Administration
threatens to upend this longstanding regime through proposed
regulations, revised guidance, and punitive enforcement practices.
Finally, the Article identifies the contours of data-sharing among federal
and state agencies, including what protections exist to prevent
government officials from repurposing that data for use in immigration
enforcement actions.
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INTRODUCTION
Since a Republican Congress passed and a Democratic President
signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
1
Act of 1996 (PRWORA) in 1996, the United States has drawn
distinctions between citizens and noncitizens for the purposes of public
benefits. These distinctions have endured, in a bipartisan fashion, for two
decades. During that time, some states used PRWORA to go even further
in eliminating eligibility for immigrants. Other states have filled eligibility
2
gaps with state-run public benefit programs. Some states have done
both: extending eligibility to state-funded programs for noncitizens only
to eliminate eligibility years later. Suffice it to say, regardless of who
occupies the White House now or in the years to come, federal and state
law will continue to exclude many in-status immigrants from accessing
public benefits like medical, food, cash, and disability assistance.
However, even if the Trump Administration and its allies in Congress
leave public benefits eligibility untouched, this administration could alter
1

Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA), Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 1, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1305
(2000)).
2
Adrianne Ortega, . . . And Health Care for All: Immigrants in the Shadow of the
Promise of Universal Health Care, 35 Am. J. L. & Med. 185, 188 (2009).
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how immigration status and poverty law intersect in dramatic ways. Some
of those changes, but not all, would require Congressional approval.
One area that would not require new legislation to alter the nexus of
3
immigration law and welfare is public charge doctrine. Public charge
determinations allow immigration authorities to prevent individuals from
entering the country whom they deem likely to rely on government
support. Public charge determinations also allow authorities to deport
immigrants who use public benefits. While the federal statutes governing
public charge determinations are well over a century old, this authority is
4
rarely invoked in removal proceedings. Although consular officials
sometimes deny entry on the basis of public charge, sponsor deeming
and seeking reimbursement appears to be even less common than
removal on public charge grounds. However, an expansion of public
charge liability for the immigrant and his sponsor could drastically alter
how immigrants interact with public benefit programs, let alone with one
another. And putting public charge doctrine to one side, public benefit
data could be repurposed for immigration enforcement purposes.
To explore what the current administration could mean for the
intersection of immigration law and poverty law, this Article proceeds in
three parts. In Part I, the Article begins by mapping the unpredictable
landscape of noncitizen eligibility for public benefits. In Part II, the
Article then analyzes public charge doctrine and the ways in which the
Trump Administration threatens to upend this longstanding regime. In
Part III, this Article identifies the contours of data-sharing among federal
and state agencies, including what protections exist to keep that data
confidential.
I. LEGAL IMMIGRANTS OUTSIDE THE WELFARE STATE
In recent years, immigration law and its attendant emphasis on an
entrance and exit system for noncitizens have overshadowed alienage. By
focusing on how the federal government treats noncitizens trying to
enter or remain in the country, scholars have given insufficient attention
to how the government treats immigrants while they reside in the United
States. That inquiry should begin with what basic services are made
available to noncitizens. The last 20 years has made such an inquiry more
complicated. The 1996 Welfare Reform Act eliminated eligibility for
millions of noncitizens for cash assistance, food assistance, medical
assistance, and disability benefits. That legislation invited a patchwork of
eligibility rules by empowering states to maintain or further eliminate
3

An individual seeking admission to the United States or seeking to adjust status
is inadmissible if the individual, “at the time of application for admission or
adjustment of status, is likely at any time to become a public charge.” Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(a)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A) (2012).
4
See, e.g., Matter of Harutunian, 14 I & N Dec. 583, 584, 586 (B.I.A. 1974).
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5

A. Public Benefits in the United States
For the sake of clarity, this Article focuses on four means-tested
public assistance programs in the United States: Medicaid, the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Temporary Aid to
Needy Families (TANF), and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). These
four programs represent the bulk of federal and state spending on public
6
assistance to poor families and individuals. Before explaining how
noncitizen eligibility rules function in each of these four programs, it is
worth briefly introducing each.
Medicaid
Created in 1965, Medicaid is a program jointly funded by the federal
and state governments to assist states in furnishing medical assistance to
7
needy individuals and families. Anyone who qualifies under program
rules can receive Medicaid. States administer Medicaid, which generally
8
determines the financial eligibility criteria for participants. However, the
state rules must comply with certain federal requirements.
First, states must cover “mandatory” populations, including children
in families with income below 138% of the federal poverty level (FPL),
pregnant women with income below 138% FPL, parents whose income is
low enough so as to be eligible for the state’s TANF program, seniors,
9
and persons with disabilities who receive SSI. A state’s Medicaid program
5

PRWORA § 402, 110 Stat. at 2262.
It is worth noting that while outlays for these programs are substantial, they are
dwarfed by spending on defense and the elderly, some of whom are in fact lowincome. The federal budget amounted to $3.9 trillion in the 2016 fiscal year. More
than half of the federal budget went to Social Security (24% of the budget or $916
billion), defense spending (15.5% or $605 billion), and Medicare (15.2% or $594
billion). Policy Basics: Where Do Our Federal Tax Dollars Go?, Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y
Priorities (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-budget/policy-basicswhere-do-our-federal-tax-dollars-go. For participation rates in public benefits programs,
see Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, 21.3 Percent of U.S. Population Participates in
Government Assistance Programs Each Month (May 28, 2015), https://www.census.
gov/newsroom/press-releases/2015/cb15-97.html.
7
42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2012). According to the 2016 Actuarial Report on the
Financial Outlook of Medicaid, overall Medicaid spending for FY 2016 was $575.9
billion, with federal expenditures making up 63% or $363.4 billion and state
expenditures were approximately $212.5 billion. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 2016 Actuarial Report on the Financial Outlook for Medicaid iv,
6

https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Research/ActuarialStudies/
Downloads/MedicaidReport2016.pdf.
8

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a).
Id. § 1396a(k)–(m). So far, 31 states and the District of Columbia have, under
the Affordable Care Act, expanded Medicaid to parents and childless adults up to
138% FPL. Prosperity Now Scorecard: Medicaid Expansion, Prosperity Now, http://
9
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must also offer medical assistance for certain basic services to most
10
categorically needy populations. States may also receive federal
matching funds to extend coverage to optional populations like pregnant
women, children, and parents whose income is above 138% FPL; the
elderly and persons with disabilities with income below the poverty line;
11
and those who are considered “medically needy” people. States may also
receive federal funding to provide certain optional services like
diagnostic services, prescription drugs and prosthetic devices,
12
rehabilitation and physical therapy, and hospice care.
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)
While federal nutrition assistance dates back to the New Deal, the
modern SNAP program was created in 1977. SNAP provides food13
purchasing assistance to low-income individuals and families. Like
Medicaid, SNAP benefits are considered an entitlement—a state needs to
cover every eligible household which applies for the benefit. SNAP
14
benefits are provided on a “household” basis. In federal law, a SNAP
“household” means “an individual who lives alone or who, while living
with others, customarily purchases food and prepares meals for home
consumption separate and apart from the others; or a group of
individuals who live together and customarily purchase food and prepare
15
meals together for home consumption.” SNAP households may use the
benefit to purchase food at one of the quarter million retailers
scorecard.prosperitynow.org/2016/measure/medicaid-expansion. The Supreme Court

held in NFIB v. Sebelius that the federal government could not require states to
expand Medicaid in such a way, rendering the provision optional. 567 U.S. 519, 588
(2012).
10
These services include “inpatient hospital services”; “outpatient hospital
services”; “pregnancy-related services including prenatal care and 60 days postpartum
pregnancy-related services”; “vaccines for children”; “physician services”; “nursing
facility services for persons aged 21 or older”; “family planning services and supplies”;
“rural health clinic services”; “home health care for persons eligible for skilled
nursing services”; “laboratory and x-ray services”; “pediatric and family nurse
practitioner services”; “nurse-midwife services”; “federally qualified health-center
(FQHC) services and ambulatory services of an FQHC that would be available in
other settings”; and “early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment
(EPSDT) services for children under age 21.” Barbara S. Klees et al., U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., Brief Summaries of Medicare & Medicaid 28 (2016),
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/MedicareProgramRatesStats/Downloads/MedicareMedicaidSummaries2016
.pdf.
11
An individual is considered medically needy if their income exceeds the state’s
regular Medicaid eligibility limit but their medical expenses reduce their disposable
income below the Medicaid means-test. 42 C.F.R. § 435.831(d) (2017).
12
Klees et al., supra note 10, at 28–29.
13
7 U.S.C. § 2013 (2012).
14
Id. § 2014(a).
15
Id. § 2012(m).
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authorized by the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) to participate in the
16
program. However, SNAP households cannot use the benefit to
purchase other necessary household items, like sanitary products, nor
17
can they use SNAP to purchase hot foods prepared at the retailer.
Federal law lays out SNAP eligibility rules and benefit amounts. To
qualify for benefits, a SNAP household’s income must be at or below
18
130% FPL, the household’s net monthly income (after deductions for
expenses like housing and child care) must be less than or equal to 100%
FPL, and its assets must fall below limits identified in the federal
19
regulations. SNAP’s benefit formula calculates that families will spend
20
30% of their net income on food. Households with no net income
receive the maximum amount per month ($504 for a family of three),
21
but the average monthly benefit is far lower ($253). The average
22
monthly benefit per person is $125 a month or $1.40 per meal.
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
Since the Social Security Act of 1935, the federal government has
required states to operate cash assistance programs for poor families with
23
children. Until 1996, Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC)’s federalist structure resembled Medicaid and SNAP in so far as
states were required to serve families who applied and met the eligibility
24
requirements. Congress replaced AFDC with the Temporary Assistance
to Needy Families (TANF) block grant, which vastly expanded state
25
discretion to operate their own programs. For TANF, states determine
the financial eligibility criteria for families and cash assistance benefit
26
amounts given to families. TANF recipients must engage in work

16

SNAP Retailer Data, 2016 Year End Summary, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (Dec. 15,
2016), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/2016-SNAP-RetailerManagement-Year-End-Summary.pdf.
17
7 U.S.C. §§ 2012(k), 2013(a).
18
This requirement does not apply to households with an elderly or disabled
member. Id. § 2014(c)(2).
19
In fiscal year 2018, the resource limits are $2,250 for households without an
elderly or disabled member and $3,500 for those with an elderly or disabled member.
A Quick Guide to SNAP Eligibility and Benefits, Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities,
https://www.cbpp.org/research/a-quick-guide-to-snap-eligibility-and-benefits
(last
updated Sept. 14, 2017).
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620, 627 (1935) (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. (repealed 1996)).
24
Id.
25
Gene Falk, Cong. Research Serv., R44668, The Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant: A Legislative History 1 (2017).
26
42 U.S.C. § 604(a).
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activities and states must sanction recipients who fail to meet those work
27
requirements.
While TANF can be used for more basic necessities than SNAP,
TANF benefit amounts are too low to make ends meet and have further
eroded since 1996. No state’s TANF benefits get a family of three to 60%
28
29
FPL. Most states’ benefits do not even get that family to 30% FPL. Far
fewer Americans receive TANF: only 1.4 million families compared to the
roughly 42 million and 68 million respectively who receive SNAP and
30
Medicaid.
Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
Created in 1972, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) provides
monthly case assistance to low-income individuals who are age 65 or
31
older, are blind, or have a disability. Recipients may only have limited
32
resources aside from the SSI benefits. In 2017, the maximum monthly
33
benefits for an SSI individual recipient was $735. There are roughly 5.5
34
million SSI recipients.
27

PRWORA, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 407(c)(1)(A), 110 Stat. 2131, 213 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 607(c)(1)(A) (2)); see also Noah D. Zatz, What Welfare Requires from Work,
54 UCLA L. Rev. 373, 377 (2006).
28
Ife Floyd, TANF Cash Benefits Have Fallen by More than 20 Percent in Most States
and Continue to Erode, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities (Oct. 13, 2017), https://
www.cbpp.org/research/family-income-support/tanf-cash-benefits-have-fallen-bymore-than-20-percent-in-most-states.
29
Id.
30
Id.; Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Participation and Costs, U.S. Dep’t
of Agric. (Mar. 9, 2018), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/pd/
SNAPsummary.pdf; December 2017 Medicaid and CHIP Enrollment Data Highlights,
Medicaid.gov, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/program-information/medicaidand-chip-enrollment-data/report-highlights/index.html.
31
42 U.S.C. § 1381a. The definition of disability differs for children versus adults.
Children are considered “disabled” “if that individual has a medically determinable
physical or mental impairment, which results in marked and severe functional
limitations, and which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c(a)(3)(c)(i). An adult

shall be considered to be disabled . . . if he is unable to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.

Id. § 1382c (a)(3)(A); see Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 541 (1990) (ruling that SSI
determinations for claims by children were inconsistent with the “comparable
severity” standard of the Social Security Act).
32
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Resources, U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin. (2017),
https://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-resources-ussi.htm.
33
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Benefits, U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin. (2017),
https://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-benefits-ussi.htm.
34
Monthly Statistical Snapshot, January 2018, Table 1, U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin. (2018),
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/stat_snapshot.

LCB_22_2_Article_6_Hammond (Do Not Delete)

508

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

8/28/2018 9:21 AM

[Vol. 22:2

Two qualifications are in order. First, it is worth remembering that
there are other public benefit programs that support low-income
35
Americans, including immigrants. Second, it is somewhat misleading to
talk about these four public benefit programs in tandem because few
American families receive multiple benefits. SNAP and Medicaid are the
two public benefits that Americans are most likely to receive and to
receive in tandem. While most TANF recipients receive SNAP and
Medicaid, there are only 2.5 million TANF recipients nationwide and
36
fewer than a quarter of these receive housing assistance.
B. The Intersection of Alienage and Welfare Law Since 1996
The federal government has always excluded some noncitizens from
public benefits programs. Undocumented immigrants are not eligible for
37
cash assistance, food assistance, disability benefits, or medical assistance.
Hospitals must provide emergency assistance to undocumented
38
individuals, but these individuals are not eligible for Medicaid.
However, the 1996 legislation, as with much federal legislation
targeting marginalized communities, changed the federal landscape for
39
immigrants and their ability to access public benefits. Previously, people
who were in the U.S. either without documentation or on temporary visas
(such as students) were ineligible for public benefits. But in-status
immigrants like Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs) were considered to
40
be analogous to U.S. citizens for the purpose of public benefits. After

35

Examples of other programs include Head Start; Women, Infants, and
Children; Section 8 housing vouchers; and the School Lunch program.
36
TANF: Total Number of Recipients, Fiscal Year 2017, https://www.acf.hhs.
gov/sites/default/files/ofa/2017_recipient_tan.pdf.
37
Tanya Broder et al., Nat’l Immigration Law Ctr., Overview of
Immigrant Eligibility for Federal Programs 1 (2015), https://www.nilc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/12/overview-immeligfedprograms-2015-12-09.pdf.
38
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd(a)(b) (2012) [hereinafter EMTALA]; 42 C.F.R. §§ 413.35(2)(d),
482.2(a)(1)(2)(b), 489.24(a)(i)(ii) (2017). EMTALA mandated hospitals receiving
federal funding to screen and stabilize all persons in their emergency department
who exhibit emergency medical conditions regardless of citizenship or ability to pay.
The legislative history of the Act suggests that Congress was particularly concerned
about the widespread practice of “patient dumping.” H.R. Rep. No. 100-531, 2d Sess.
2–3 (1988) (defining “dumping” as transferring patients from one hospital to
another without first stabilizing them, refusing to provide medical treatment to
patients, or delaying treatment to patients because they were either uninsured or too
poor to pay for their care.); see also Maria O’Brien Hylton, The Economics and Politics of
Emergency Health Care for the Poor: The Patient Dumping Dilemma, 1992 BYU L. Rev. 971,
981, 983.
39
See, e.g., Broder et al., supra note 37, at 1.
40
Id.
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welfare reform in 1996, in-status immigrants were placed outside the
welfare state.
The 1996 legislation, the Personal Responsibility and Work
41
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), radically changed means42
tested cash assistance in the United States. As discussed above, Congress
replaced an entitlement program, Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC), with TANF, a program funded through block grants
that drastically increased state discretion. Among its many sweeping
changes, PRWORA created a citizen/noncitizen distinction not just for
43
TANF, but for Medicaid, SNAP, and SSI as well. Indeed, the
Congressional Budget Office calculated that 40% of the savings of
PRWORA came from eliminating immigrant eligibility in these
44
programs.
Categorizing Immigrants as Qualified or Nonqualified
PRWORA restricted access to these four programs for lawfully
present immigrants on the basis of three factors: (1) their immigration
status, (2) when they arrived in the United States, and (3) how long they
45
have been present in the U.S. PRWORA created two categories of
immigrants in the law of federal public benefits programs: qualified
46
immigrants and nonqualified immigrants.
Importantly, nonqualified immigrants within the meaning of
PRWORA are not unauthorized immigrants within the meaning of
47
immigration law. In other words, many legal immigrants are considered
nonqualified for public benefits purposes. Nor is their exclusion
comprehensive: nonqualified immigrants are eligible for emergency
Medicaid (if they are otherwise eligible for their state’s Medicaid
48
program) and immunizations. Nonqualified children are eligible for

41

PRWORA, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 402(a), 110 Stat. 2105, 2262 (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1612 (2000)).
42
See Andrew Hammond, Welfare and Federalism’s Peril, 92 Wash. L. Rev. 1721,
1731–32 (2017).
43
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Overview of Immigrants’
Eligibility for SNAP, TANF, Medicaid, and CHIP 2 (2012), https://aspe.hhs.gov/
system/files/pdf/76426/ib.pdf.
44
Claire R. Thomas & Ernie Collette, Unaccompanied and Excluded from Food
Security: A Call for the Inclusion of Immigrant Youth Twenty Years After Welfare Reform, 31
Geo. Immigr. L.J. 197, 204 n.32, 208 (2017) (“Due to the passage of PRWORA,
approximately 935,000 non-citizens lost benefits . . . .”). See also Amanda Levinson,
Immigrants and Welfare Use, Migration Policy Inst. (Aug. 1, 2002),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigrants-and-welfare-use.
45
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 43, at 2.
46
Id.
47
Broder et al., supra note 37, at 2.
48
42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v) (2012). States differ in their definition of emergency
services. See, e.g., Greenery Rehab. Grp., Inc. v. Hammon, 150 F.3d 226, 228, 233 (2d
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the school breakfast and lunch programs, and every state has continued
to make Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants,
49
and Children (WIC) available to noncitizens.
PRWORA also made a distinction between qualified immigrants
arriving prior to the enactment of PRWORA (August 22, 1996) and those
50
arriving after. Federal law now prohibits post-PRWORA immigrants
from receiving public benefits until they have five years of qualified
51
status. A few categories are exempt from what is often referred to as this
“five-year ban”: refugees, asylees, other immigrants exempt on
humanitarian grounds, and military personnel/veterans and their
52
families.
Enabling State Eligibility Rules
PRWORA’s restrictions on immigrant access to public benefits built
on earlier efforts at the state level as well as concern among politicians
that welfare programs were drawing not only immigrants to the U.S. but
also enticing American citizens to move to states with more generous
53
welfare benefits. This concern about “welfare magnets” has persisted
54
despite little evidence that it occurs. Through PRWORA, Congress
permitted states to go even further in treating noncitizens differently
from citizens in the public benefits context. PRWORA contains a
provision that explicitly authorizes states to limit the benefits of new
interstate migrants to the levels they would have received had they stayed
55
in their original state.
Challenges to disparate treatment of noncitizens under state law are
more likely to succeed, all else being equal, than challenges to federal
law. After all, alienage is a suspect classification under the Fourteenth
56
Amendment. The Supreme Court has identified noncitizens as “a prime
example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority” and therefore, “a state’s

Cir. 1998) (denying Medicaid reimbursement for treating immigrants that had
suffered brain injuries so severe that they were incapable of performing basic
functions such as feeding themselves).
49
8 U.S.C. § 1615(a) (2012); Molly Redden, Undocumented Immigrants Avoid Vital
Nutrition Services for Fear of Deportation, The Guardian (May 9, 2017), https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/may/09/undocumented-immigrants-wicnutrition-services-deportation.
50
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 43, at 2.
51
PRWORA, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 403(a), 110 Stat. 2105, 2265 (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1612 (2000)).
52
Id. at § 403(b), 110 Stat. at 2265–66.
53
See Steven D. Schwinn, Toward a More Expansive Welfare Devolution Debate, 9
Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 311, 320 (2005).
54
Id.
55
42 U.S.C. § 604(c) (2012).
56
See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374–75 (1971) (invalidating stateimposed alienage-based classifications).
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alienage-based classifications inherently raise concerns of invidious
discrimination and are therefore generally subject to strict judicial
57
scrutiny.” Even a state’s “otherwise ‘valid interest in preserving the fiscal
integrity of [state] programs’ is generally insufficient grounds for a state58
imposed burden on alienage to survive an equal protection challenge.”
59
Congress is not so confined. When Congress treats noncitizens
differently from other groups, courts analyze that action in the context of
60
national immigration policy rather than invidious discrimination. In
light of its plenary power, Congress’s actions must only survive rational
61
basis review.
However, this neat distinction between federal and state treatment of
noncitizens often fails to aid a court faced with an equal protection
62
challenge to state discrimination of noncitizens in the welfare context.
Put short, most federal public benefits programs are “not solely funded
63
and administered by the federal government.” As a result, a state’s
alienage-based distinction that uses PRWORA will not “originate purely
64
from state legislation unlike the restrictions struck down in Graham.”
Therefore, what should be the standard for such a state law that invokes
the federal welfare reform statute?

57

Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938)).
58
Id.
59
See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80–85 (1976) (holding that federal alienagebased restrictions of Medicare benefits did not violate noncitizen’s Fifth Amendment
due process rights).
60
Id. at 79–80.
61
See id. at 80–85; see also Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 95 (1976)
(“Congress and the President have broad power over immigration and naturalization
which the States do not possess.”).
62
Bruns, 750 F.3d at 66 (“Because Medicaid, unlike Medicare, is not solely
funded and administered by the federal government, this case does not fall neatly
within the holding of Mathews.”). I will set to one side the problem of a constitution
that permits a national government to devolve its power to discriminate against
noncitizens. See generally Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority
Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31
Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 965, 987 (2004) (“[T]he immigration power is an exclusively
federal power that must be exercised uniformly.”); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of
Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 493, 496 (2001) (arguing that Congress’s 1996 effort to devolve its federal
immigration power is unconstitutional). The federal government claims that power
can be devolved to state and local actors as well as that, unless preempted, states have
some inherent authority to enforce at least certain aspects of immigration law. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Non-Preemption of the Auth. of State & Local Law Enforcement Officials to
Arrest Aliens for Immigration Violations, 26 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2002).
63
Bruns, 750 F.3d at 66.
64
Id.
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The Supreme Court suggested an answer in Plyler when it reasoned
that “if the Federal Government has by uniform rule prescribed what it
believes to be appropriate standards for the treatment of an alien
65
subclass, the States may, of course, follow the federal direction.” That
formulation in Plyler begs two questions: was there a “federal direction”
implicit in PRWORA, and if so, what was it?
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have held that PRWORA represents a
uniform federal policy that states can deny eligibility to some
66
nonimmigrants. Such a conclusion would suggest that a state’s decision
to restrict noncitizens’ access to public benefits pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
67
§§ 1612(b) and 1622(a) need only survive rational basis review. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1622(a) reads, “[A] State is authorized to determine the eligibility for
68
any State public benefits of an alien who is a qualified alien . . . .”
It seems odd that Congress could create a uniform federal policy by
permitting each state to go its own way. In effect, courts would have to
conclude that PRWORA’s devolved discretion is a uniform rule, not its
69
opposite. Putting to one side whether a Congressional rule permitting
inconsistency is considered a consistent federal direction, the Supreme
Court has held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits state
discrimination in actions resulting from “a State’s desire to preserve
70
limited welfare benefits for its own citizens.” Indeed, state appellate
courts in Maryland, Massachusetts, and New York have followed this line
71
of reasoning. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has rejected previous
65

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982).
See Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 583–84 (9th Cir. 2014); Soskin v. Reinertson,
353 F.3d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004).
67
See Korab, 797 F.3d at 584 (citing Plyler for rational basis standard). But see
Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1255 (citing Plyler for intermediate scruitiny). See also Bruns, 750
F.3d at 71 n.3 (citing both cases but declining to reach the issue). Commentators
have described these cases as “reflect[ing] a congressional imprimatur theory of state
alienage discrimination.” Jenny-Brooke Condon, The Preempting of Equal Protection for
Immigrants?, 73 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 77, 129–50 (2016) (collecting and discussing
post-PRWORA alienage classification cases in state supreme courts and federal
appellate courts); see also David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram,
Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 583, 599 (2017) (concluding that
“lower federal courts may be trending toward giving sub-federal laws more deference,
with reasoning that seems to channel plenary power analysis”).
68
INA § 412, 8 U.S.C. § 1622(a) (2012).
69
Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth., 946 N.E.2d 1262, 1276–
77 (Mass. 2011); Ehrlich v. Perez, 908 A.2d 1220, 1240–41 (Md. 2006); Aliessa ex rel.
Fayad v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1098 (N.Y. 2001).
70
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971).
71
Finch, 946 N.E.2d at 1276–77; Perez, 908 A.2d at 1234–41; Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at
1098; see also Fatma Marouf, Alienage Classifications and the Denial of Health Care to
Dreamers, 93 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1271, 1313 (2016) (pointing out that “[t]he
conclusions of these state courts are directly antithetical to the conclusions of the
Ninth and Tenth Circuits, creating a division among courts about the proper
66
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petitions to resolve this question of whether or not the federal
government can, in effect, lend the states its more deferential rational
72
basis standard by prescribing a “uniform rule” to follow.
What is clear is that, under PRWORA, state governments will
continue to establish, tweak, and eliminate state-funded programs that
73
provide welfare, food assistance, and medical assistance for immigrants.
States are far more constrained in their fiscal policy than the federal
74
government. Forty-nine states are prohibited by statute or their state
75
constitutions to run a deficit. As a result, states will regularly look to
76
balance their budgets with cuts to services. Often, these state-funded
public benefit programs for immigrants are targets for cuts in the
77
vicissitudes of state budgetary politics. Federal and state courts have
78
upheld some of these cuts and struck down others.
For example, Medicaid often makes up the largest slice of a state’s
79
budget. It is conceivable that in some states, immigrants and their allies
will be able to organize to beat back proposals to eliminate services, but

standard of review for hybrid statutes that bridge state and federal action”); Mel
Cousins, Equal Protection: Immigrants’ Access to Healthcare and Welfare Benefits, 12
Hastings Race & Poverty L.J. 21, 23–26 (2015). The First Circuit summed up this
complexity:
[T]his case presents a Gordian knot of federal and state legislation effecting an
adverse impact on resident aliens: a federal-state cooperative program
(Medicaid), the eligibility for which was subsequently limited on the basis of
alienage by federal legislation (PRWORA), to which the state of Maine
responded by first creating, and then terminating, supplemental state-funded
medical assistance benefits for PRWORA-ineligible aliens only.

Bruns, 750 F.3d at 66.
72
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982).
73
Gregory A. Huber & Thomas J. Espenshade, Neo-Isolationism, Balanced-Budget
Conservatism, and the Fiscal Impacts of Immigrants, 31 Int’l Migration Rev. 1031, 1045
(1997) (“These changes [in PRWORA and IIRIRA] have given new force to state
efforts to restrict immigrant use of social services.”).
74
See Hammond, supra note 42, at 1730 (discussing state budgetary pressures in
regards to TANF); Nicholas Bagley, Federalism and the End of Obamacare, 127 Yale L.J.
F. 1, 9–10 (2017) (“With the exception of Vermont, the states are legally obliged to
balance their budgets every year.”).
75
Id. at 1730 n.19.
76
Id. at 1744–45.
77
Eric Russell, Maine’s Top Court to Decide Whether Asylum Seekers Can Get Food
Stamps, Portland Press Herald (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.pressherald.com/
2017/11/17/maines-top-court-to-decide-whether-unemployed-asylum-seekers-can-getfood-stamps/.
78
See e.g., Pham v. Starkowsky, 16 A.3d 635 (Conn. 2011).
79
Pew Charitable Trusts, State Health Care Spending on Medicaid: A 50State Study of Trends and Drivers of Cost (2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/
~/media/data-visualizations/interactives/2014/medicaid/downloadables/state_health_
care_spending_on_medicaid.pdf; Medicaid’s Share of State Budgets, MACPAC, https://
www.macpac.gov/subtopic/medicaids-share-of-state-budgets/.

LCB_22_2_Article_6_Hammond (Do Not Delete)

514

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

8/28/2018 9:21 AM

[Vol. 22:2

80

not always. Politicians regularly embrace xenophobic rhetoric and
81
policies to solidify electoral support. The Maine program at issue in
Bruns v. Mayhew is the most recent, but not the last time the federal
courts will struggle to assess the legality of state discrimination of
82
immigrants in public benefit programs. If anything, the policies and
rhetoric of the Trump Administration will embolden political allies in
83
state governments to pursue more statutory changes along these lines.
C. Immigrant Eligibility Rules Post-PRWORA
Following the passage of PRWORA, Congress restored eligibility for
some select populations of immigrants. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997
restored access to SSI and Medicaid for elderly and disabled
84
immigrants. In 1998, the Agricultural Research, Extension, and
Education Reform Act (AREERA) restored SNAP eligibility for
immigrant children living in the United States prior to the passage of
85
PRWORA. The 2002 Farm Bill restored SNAP eligibility for some
86
immigrant children as well as parents after 40 quarters of work status.
Nonetheless, as the House Ways and Means’s Green Book stated, “The

80

Insights from political science would suggest that immigrant groups will be
most successful with Medicaid, given the healthcare industry’s reliance on
government funding; less successful with food assistance, where they may be able to
forge coalitions with grocers, other retailers, and the agriculture industry; and least
successful when it comes to cash assistance where the typical allies will be the alreadyconverted, the social service and advocacy groups that already see the benefit in
helping families meet basic needs, particularly during economic downturns.
81
Lisa Sun-Hee Park, Perpetuation of Poverty Through “Public Charge,” 78 Denv. U.
L. Rev. 1161, 1165 n.20 (2001).
82
Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2014).
83
Huber & Espenshade, supra note 73, at 1048 (“Growing anti-immigrant
sentiment has coalesced with forces of fiscal conservatism to make immigrants an easy
target of budget cuts.”). These forces are also at work in European Union member
states. The European Court of Justice recently allowed both the United Kingdom and
Germany to restrict immigrant access to public benefits. See Commission v. United
Kingdom Case C-308/14 (June 14, 2016); Florin Dano v. Jobcenter Leipzig, Case C-333/13
(November 11, 2014). See also Markus Crepaz, Trust Beyond Borders:
Immigration, the Welfare State, and Identity in Modern Societies (2008).
84
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997).
85
Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105–185, 112 Stat. 523 (1998).
86
Not all subsequent developments of federal law expanded access. For instance,
the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 tightened eligibility requirements for Medicaid
beneficiaries by adding additional requirements for citizenship and immigration
documentation. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4, 80; see
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 4401, 116
Stat. 134, 333–34.
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basic policy laid out by the 1996 welfare law remains essentially
87
unchanged for noncitizens entering after its enactment.”
Immigrant Eligibility Rules Today
Refugees, asylees, victims of trafficking, Cuban and Haitian
immigrants, Iraqi or Afghans with special immigrant status, and
individuals granted withholding of deportation or removal are eligible
88
for Medicaid. Other adult LPRs are eligible after the five-year waiting
89
period. Immigrants who have LPR status and are either pregnant or
under 18 can be covered should a state choose to, or they will also be
eligible after the five-year waiting period. DACA recipients and
90
undocumented immigrants remain ineligible, but as discussed above,
Medicaid coverage is mandatory for emergency medical treatment for
91
those populations. Generally, for Medicaid, qualified immigrants
include those who came to the U.S. before August 22, 1996 (i.e., before
92
PRWORA) as well as children who came after.
For SNAP, immigrant children with LPR status, refugees, asylees,
members of the armed forces and their dependents, victims of

87

Staff of H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 106th Cong., Background Material
and Data on Programs Within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and
Means 1372 (Comm. Print 2000). See also Claire R. Thomas and Ernie Collette,
Unaccompanied and Excluded from Food Security, 31 Geo. Immig. L. J 197, 232
(2017) (noting that “since PRWORA’s re-authorization in the Deficit Reduction Act
(DRA) of 2005, there has been no congressional push to revisit or amend any of the
restrictive Title IV provisions”).
88
Coverage for Lawfully Present Immigrants, HealthCare.gov, https://www.
healthcare.gov/immigrants/lawfully-present-immigrants/.
89
Id.
90
42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(1); INA § 401, 8 U.S.C. § 1611 (2012).
91
42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(2).
92
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 also provided $40 billion in federal funding
to be used to provide health care coverage for low-income children—generally those
in families with income below 200% FPL who do not qualify for Medicaid and would
otherwise be uninsured. Title XXI of the Social Security Act, the Children’s Health
Insurance Program (CHIP), known from its inception until March 2009 as the State
Children’s Health Insurance Program or SCHIP. CHIP funding has been extended
through fiscal year 2017 by subsequent legislation, including the Children’s Health
Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-3, 123 Stat. 8, 10;
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18001); and the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization
Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-10, 129 Stat. 87. Under CHIP, states may elect to provide
coverage to qualifying children by expanding their Medicaid programs, or through a
State program separate from Medicaid. A number of States have also been granted
waivers to cover parents of children enrolled in CHIP. Moreover, the Affordable Care
Act went beyond the “qualified” definition in Medicaid and CHIP to enroll in the
marketplace exchanges (100% and 400% FPL) and the immigrants who were lawfully
present, but not qualified (0 to 100% FPL).
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93

trafficking, Cuban immigrants, and Haitian immigrants are eligible.
94
Adult immigrants with LPR status are eligible after five years. Asylum
applicants, individuals with temporary status (like tourists or students),
95
and undocumented noncitizens are ineligible. If a household
constitutes more than one person, then the income of each member of
96
the household is aggregated for purposes of the income test. This is
true even where other members of the household are not applying for
SNAP benefits and, indeed, would not qualify if they did apply. If a
household contains any members who are not applying for SNAP
benefits, then the SNAP benefits allotted to that household will not cover
those non-applicant members, despite the fact that their income is
included in the income test. Thus, SNAP applicants’ income is
considered to include the income earned by each member of their
household, even if one or more of those other members are not qualified
97
aliens.
For TANF, generally those immigrants who came before PRWORA
98
are eligible, and those who came after are not. Unlike Medicaid and
SNAP, TANF eligibility rules make no distinction between immigrant
99
children and their parents. States can create a substitute program for
immigrant families to replace the terminated benefits from federal cash
assistance, but they can only use funds from their block grant for this
purpose if these families have lived in the United States for at least five
100
years. States must use their own funds if they want to cover immigrant
families during their first five years of residence. Twenty-eight states
responded to this elimination of federal eligibility by creating their own
programs, but those programs often reflected tightened conditionality,
including requirements for residency and naturalization as well as time
101
limits. Several states have chosen to continue to allow immigrant
families to receive TANF or SNAP during their first five years of
102
residency.

93

SNAP Policy on Non-Citizen Eligibility, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., https://www.fns.
usda.gov/snap/snap-policy-non-citizen-eligibility (last updated Mar. 24, 2017).
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
7 U.S.C. § 2014 (2012).
97
Id. § 2015(f).
98
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 43.
99
See, e.g., Barbara J. Shaklee, Undocumented Immigrant Children: Legal
Considerations Regarding Human Services Needs, 34 Colo. L 93 (2005).
100
Staff of H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 106th Cong., Background Material
and Data on Programs Within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and
Means 1375 (Comm. Print 2000).
101
Karen C. Tumlin & Wendy Zimmerman, Immigrants and TANF: A Look at
Immigrant Welfare Recipients in Three Cities (2003).
102
Mapping Public Benefits for Immigrants in the States, Pew Charitable Trusts
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LPRs, whether they are children or adults, are eligible to receive SSI
benefits five years after receiving their green card and after earning 40
103
work credits from the Social Security Administration (SSA). Refugees,
asylees, victims of trafficking, Cuban immigrants, Haitian immigrants,
104
and Iraqi or Afghan special immigrants are eligible to receive benefits.
If only one member of a couple qualifies for SSI, SSA may consider part
105
of the ineligible spouse’s income as the eligible spouse’s.
Consequences for Mixed-Status Families
Public benefits eligibility creates an irrational regime in light of the
106
constitutional commitment to birthright citizenship. Parental status
rarely affects children’s statutory eligibility or entitlement to these
107
programs, but parental status nevertheless impedes access.
Undocumented and legal, but unqualified, immigrants often do not
know their children may be eligible for public benefits. They face poorly
trained agency workers who do not know how to properly handle “mixedstatus” applications. Parents may not have the required documentation
for their children, and, above all, they are deterred by the threat of
108
detention and deportation.

(Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/
2014/09/mapping-public-benefits-for-immigrants-in-the-states.
103
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) for Noncitizens, U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin. (Aug.
2017), https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-11051.pdf.
104
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(1) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1611 (2012).
105
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Income, U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin. (2017),
https://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-income-ussi.htm.
106
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that persons born in the United States
and subject to its jurisdiction obtain citizenship). See United States v. Wong Kim Ark,
169 U.S. 649, 693 (1898) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment, “in clear words
and in manifest intent, includes the children born, within the territory of the United
States, of all other persons, of whatever race or color, domiciled within the United
States”). It is worth noting that some individuals who are born abroad may also
acquire citizenship at birth. See INA § 301(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (a child born abroad
to two U.S. citizen parents acquires U.S. citizenship provided that one of the parents
had a residence in the United States or one of its outlying possessions prior to the
child’s birth); id. § 1401(g) (a child born abroad to one U.S. citizen parent and one
alien parent acquires U.S. citizenship at birth); id. § 1409(a) (a child born abroad out
of wedlock to a U.S. citizen father acquires citizenship if the child meets the
conditions provided); id. § 1409(c) (a child born abroad out of wedlock to a U.S.
citizen mother acquires citizenship if the mother was a U.S. citizen at the time of the
child’s birth and if the mother was previously physically present in the United States
or its territories for a continuous period of one year).
107
Paula Fomby & Andrew J. Cherlin, Public Assistance Use Among U.S.-Born
Children of Immigrants, 38 Int’l Migration Rev. 584, 591, 599 (2004) (using sample of
2,400 low-income households from three U.S. cities and finding that children with
foreign-born caregivers are less likely than children with native-born caregivers to
receive benefits from TANF, SSI, SNAP, Medicaid, and WIC).
108
See generally Hirokazu Yoshikawa, Immigrants Raising Citizens:
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Without public benefits to stabilize families in crisis, children will go
without food, care, and medical services, increasing the risks of severe
hardship, hunger, and homelessness. This inconsistent eligibility within
mixed-status families could be solved if nonqualified parents naturalized,
109
but that is not as easy or as desirable as some suspect. Furthermore, as
we will see in Part II, immigrant adults in the U.S. have reason to suspect
that participating in public benefit programs can have negative
consequences for their immigration status.
II. PUBLIC CHARGE: IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF
WELFARE USE
Welfare eligibility rules for immigrants do not exist in a vacuum.
Rather, these eligibility rules are inextricably connected to immigration
enforcement through the longstanding doctrine of public charge. This
Part relates the history of that doctrine, the current state of the law, and
the Trump Administration’s interest in vastly expanding liability for
immigrant communities.
A. Public Charge
Concerns about how recently arrived immigrants would support
110
themselves in America date back to the founding era.
Indeed,
American municipalities and states repurposed the poor law regime the
U.S. borrowed from Britain as a proto-regulatory regime for immigration
111
enforcement. Just as British municipalities could expel recent internal
Undocumented Parents and Their Young Children (2011) (documenting
challenges faced by mixed-status families in New York City). In 2013, ICE issued a
Parental Interests Directive that created additional protections for parents and legal
guardians in ICE custody and for those who had been deported, as well as increased
coordination between immigration enforcement and state and local child welfare
agencies. See also Parental Interests Directive Fact Sheet, U.S. Immig. & Customs Enf’t,
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/parentalInterestsFactsheet.pdf.
109
See INA § 316, 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (setting out the requirements for
naturalization). Incidentally, many lawful permanent residents have not pursued
citizenship. See also Ana Gonzalez-Barrera et al., The Path Not Taken: Two-Thirds of Legal
Mexican Immigrants Are Not U.S. Citizens, Pew Research Ctr. (Feb. 4, 2013), http://
www.pewhispanic.org/files/2013/02/Naturalizations_Jan_2013_FINAL.pdf [https://
perma.cc/H8ZD-TAHB] (finding that “[i]n 2011 Mexican immigrants have a
comparatively lower rate of naturalization, 36% of those eligible, compared with 68%
for all non-Mexican immigrants”).
110
See Hidetaka Hirota, Expelling the Poor: Atlantic Seaboard States and
the Nineteenth-Century Origins of American Immigration Policy 43, 45
(2017); see also Sam White, A Cold Welcome: The Little Ice Age and Europe’s
Encounter with North America 85 (2017) (explaining how British population
growth and elite concerns about vagrancy and poverty, in part, made colonies in
North America more enticing to the British government).
111
Hirota, supra note 110, at 43, 45.
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migrants in the United Kingdom, American states and cities expelled
recent arrivals to the United States on the grounds that these immigrants
112
could not support themselves. Eager to rid their communities of those
that would rely on public support, governments resorted to physical
expulsion.
Congress first enacted a public charge provision in 1882, barring
“any person unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a
113
public charge.” In 1903, Congress extended public charge to the
114
deportation context. Congress has modified both the admissibility and
removability provisions of public charge over the last century to promote
the “national policy” that “aliens within the Nation’s borders not depend
on public resources to meet their needs, but rather rely on their own
capabilities and the resources of their families, their sponsors, and
115
private organizations. . . .”
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) makes deportable any
“alien who, within five years from the date of entry, has become a public
charge from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen since
116
entry. . . .” Case law has limited this provision to the rare cases in which
(a) the public assistance program imposed on the noncitizen or other
persons an obligation to repay the agency and (b) the agency’s demand
117
for reimbursement has not been satisfied.
Currently, it is exceedingly rare for immigration authorities to use
public charge as a ground for deportation. There were only eight public
charge deportations from 1961 to 1970, only 31 from 1971 to 1980, and
118
12 from 1981 to 1990. But public charge inadmissibility is widely
119
used. Consular officers have broad discretion in disqualifying visa
applicants under this provision: any alien is inadmissible who “in the
112

Id. at 43.
Immigration Act of 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214, 316. See Ekiu v. United
States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) (upholding exclusion of Japanese woman as a public
charge).
114
Immigration Act of 1903, ch. 1012, § 20, 32 Stat. 1213. See also Gegiow v. Uhl,
239 U.S. 3 (1915) (holding that noncitizen could not be excluded as a public charge
on ground that local labor market was “overstocked”). The 1903 statute applied to
immigrants who became public charges within two years of entry. The modern statute
extends to immigrants who become public charges within five years.
115
PRWORA § 400(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1601(2)(A) (2012).
116
INA § 237(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(5).
117
See Matter of B, 3 I. & N. Dec. 323, 326 (B.I.A. 1948).
118
James R. Edwards, Jr., Public Charge Doctrine: A Fundamental Principle of American
Immigration Policy, Ctr. for Immigr. Stud. (May 1, 2001), https://cis.org/PublicCharge-Doctrine-Fundamental-Principle-American-Immigration-Policy.
119
INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182; INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227; see Evidence Which May
Be Presented to Meet the Public Charge Provisions of the Law, U.S. Dep’t of State,
https://lv.usembassy.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/58/2016/08/en_k_visas_
financial_support_evidence.pdf.
113
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opinion of the consular officer . . . or in the opinion of the Attorney
120
General . . . is likely at any time to become a public charge.”
When Congress passed PRWORA, it also altered public charge
doctrine. Under 8 USC § 1183a, an immigrant’s sponsor became liable
under the enforceable affidavit of support for any means-tested benefits
121
provided to the sponsored immigrant. Subsequent regulations limited
those “means-tested” benefits to the four discussed in this Article, plus
medical assistance through Children’s Health Insurance Program
122
(CHIP).
For TANF, if a qualified immigrant has a sponsor, a state
administering a TANF program must include a portion of the sponsor’s
income in the qualified immigrant’s income for purposes of determining
123
that alien’s eligibility to receive benefits.
For SSI, any qualified
immigrant’s income and resources shall be deemed to include the
124
income and resources of his sponsor and such sponsor’s spouse. “If
only one member of a couple qualifies for SSI, [SSA] may consider part
125
of the ineligible member’s income as the eligible spouse’s.”
Furthermore, any qualified immigrant’s income and resources shall be
deemed to include the income and resources of his sponsor and such
126
sponsor’s spouse.
Currently, public charge determinations in the admissibility context
must assess an immigrant’s age, health, family status, financial status,
resources, education, and skills. In addition to those requirements,
family-sponsored immigrants must submit an enforceable affidavit of
127
support. This determination must be prospective and based on the
totality of the circumstances, articulating the reasons for the officer’s
128
determination.
In removal, an immigrant is deportable only if he has become a
public charge within the first five years after entry from causes not
129
affirmatively shown to have arisen since entry. Unlike the totality of the
130
circumstances test for admissibility,
the public charge test for
120

INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
INA § 213A, 8 U.S.C § 1183a.
122
Federal Means-Tested Public Benefits Paid by the Social Security
Administration, 62 Fed. Reg. 45,284 (Aug. 26, 1997).
123
42 U.S.C. § 608(f) (2012).
124
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(f)(3).
125
Soc. Sec. Admin., A Guide to Supplemental Security Income (SSI) for
Groups and Organizations 13 (2018).
126
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(f)(3).
127
INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(B).
128
Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge
Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,690 (Mar. 26, 1999).
129
INA § 237(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(5).
130
Matter of Harutunian, 14 I. & N. Dec. 583, 588 (B.I.A. 1974).
121
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removability is a three-part test that “(1) [t]he State or other governing
body must, by appropriate law, impose a charge for the services rendered
to the alien”; “(2) [t]he authorities must make demand for payment of
the charges upon those persons made liable under State law”; and “(3)
131
there must be a failure to pay for the charges.”
Subsequent agency action limited public benefits for the purposes of
public charge doctrine only when an immigrant became “primarily
dependent on the government for subsistence, as demonstrated by either
(i) the receipt of public cash assistance for income maintenance or (ii)
132
institutionalization for long-term care at government expense.” Thus,
public charge determinations only look to an individual’s receipt of
TANF, SSI, or institutionalization through Medicaid. Importantly, SNAP
and the typical use of Medicaid are excluded.
B. Trump Administration & Public Charge
The Trump Administration has considered multiple ways to upend
longstanding public charge doctrine including through Executive
Orders, instructions to Consular officials, and new regulations. At this
writing, it appears that this administration has decided to pursue this
agenda via a notice of proposed rulemaking by the Department of
Homeland Security. Before analyzing that notice and its ramifications, it
is worth detailing the Trump Administration’s other efforts (and false
starts) to date.
i. The Leaked Draft Executive Order
In the first weeks of the Trump Administration, the Washington Post
and Vox obtained copies of a leaked draft Executive Order dated January
133
23, 2017. The Executive Order, if signed, would expand the definition

131

Matter of B, 3 I. & N. Dec. 323, 326 (B.I.A. 1948).
Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge
Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. at 28,689.
133
Memorandum from Andrew Bremberg to President Trump (Jan. 23, 2017),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/aws.upl/nwica.org/executive-order-on-protectingtaxpayer-resources-by-ensuring-our-immigration-laws-promote-accountability-andresponsibility.pdf; Abigail Hauslohner & Janell Ross, Trump Administration Circulates
More Draft Immigration Restrictions, Focusing on Protecting U.S. Jobs, Wash. Post (Jan. 31,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration132

circulates-more-draft-immigration-restrictions-focusing-on-protecting-us-jobs/2017/01/31/
38529236-e741-11e6-80c2-30e57e57e05d_story.html?utm_term=.136ea4e3f02f; Helen Klein
Murillo, The Presidential Memorandum and the “Public Charge” Law, Lawfare Inst. (Mar.
7, 2017), https://lawfareblog.com/presidential-memorandum-and-public-charge-law; see
also Emma Green, First, They Excluded the Irish, The Atlantic (Feb. 2, 2017), https://

www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/trump-poor-immigrants-publiccharge/515397/.
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of public charge and also embolden enforcement actions against
134
“sponsors” who submit financial affidavits on behalf of immigrants.
Among its many provisions, the draft Executive Order would require
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to rescind “any field
guidance concerning the inadmissibility or deportability of aliens on the
ground that they are likely to be or have become public charges . . . and
replace it immediately with new field guidance consistent with the
135
provisions of this order.” Presumably, this provision is intended to
rescind the 1999 Field Guidance that restricts public charge
determinations to only TANF, SSI, and institutionalization for long-term
care.
The draft Executive Order also would require DHS to propose,
136
through notice and comment rulemaking, two rules. First, the draft
Executive Order directs DHS to propose a rule that provides standards
for inadmissibility and deportability on public charge grounds if an
immigrant is “likely to receive” for inadmissibility and “does receive” for
deportability “public benefits for which eligibility or amount is
determined in any way on the basis of income, resources, or financial
137
need.”
Second, the draft Executive Order would direct the DHS to propose
a rule that would define “means-tested public benefits” under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1183a and require reimbursement from sponsors of immigrants who
have signed affidavits of support under 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1) “to
include all Federal programs for which eligibility for benefits, or the
amount of such benefits, are determined in any way on the basis of
138
income, resources, or financial aid.” The draft Executive Order also
would direct the heads of all executive departments and agencies “to seek
reimbursement from sponsors who signed legally enforceable affidavits
. . . for the costs of Federal means-tested public benefits . . . and bring
court actions against or refer to the Attorney General those sponsors if
139
necessary to compel reimbursement.”
These agencies would also

134

Think tanks promptly began analyzing the order’s effects. See Samuel
Hammond & Robert Orr, Redefining “Public Charge”: Gauging the Threat to Noncitizens
from Trump’s Draft EO, Niskanen Ctr., https://niskanencenter.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/02/Redefining_Public_Charge.pdf; Michael Fix & Randy Capps, Leaked
Draft of Possible Trump Executive Order on Public Benefits Would Spell Chilling Effects for
Legal Immigrants, Migration Policy Inst. (Feb. 2017), https://www.migrationpolicy.
org/news/leaked-draft-possible-trump-executive-order-public-benefits-would-spell-chillingeffects-legal.
135

Memorandum from Andrew Bremberg to President Trump, supra note 133, at

136

Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.

3.
137
138
139
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“inform the Department of Homeland Security whenever they provide
any alien with Federal means-tested public benefits” as defined in the
140
draft Executive Order.
ii. Revisions to the Foreign Affairs Manual
On January 3, 2018, the State Department revised the public charge
141
section of its Foreign Affairs Manual. The Foreign Affairs Manual is a
guide for U.S. consular and embassy officials, which, among other things,
instructs them on how to make decisions about whether a noncitizen can
enter the United States and under what status category, including which
immigrant visa.
The revisions to the Foreign Affairs Manual do not (and could not)
change the most important aspects of public charge determination, i.e.
which public benefits are considered in the analysis and how the
expected use of public benefits should be weighted in the admissibility
determination. The revisions do not expand the types of public benefits,
preserving the State Department official’s exclusive focus on cash
assistance and long-term care. The revisions also maintain that the
official must consider the probable use of public benefits in light of the
totality of the circumstances, which includes consideration of each factor,
including “a) age, b) health, c) family status, d) assets, resources, and
142
financial status, and e) education and skills.”
However, the Foreign Affairs Manual revisions do provide more
precise guidance on each of these factors. For instance, applicants with a
health condition may be asked to provide proof either of health
insurance or the ability to pay health-related expenses while in the U.S.
And the revised instructions allow State Department officials to consider
receipt of non-cash benefits to be considered as part of the “totality of the
circumstances” test if such a fact is relevant in predicting whether the
person will rely on cash assistance or long-term care in the future.
Furthermore, the revisions to the Foreign Affairs Manual change
how officials at U.S. embassies and consulates should treat a sponsor’s
affidavit of support (the I-864 Form). Previous State Department practice
analyzed the sufficiency of resources identified in the Form I-864. FAM
302.8-2(B) used to contain the following: “A properly filed, nonfraudulent Form I-864 in those cases where it is required, should
normally be considered sufficient to meet the INA 212(a)(4)
requirements and satisfy the totality of the circumstances analysis.” The

140

Id. at 6.
U.S. Dep’t of State, “Public Charge” Update to 9 FAM 302.8 (Jan. 4, 2018)
https://fam.state.gov/fam/09FAM/09FAM030208.html#M302_8. See also Nat’l
Immig. L. Ctr., Changes to “Public Charge” Instructions in the U.S. State
Department’s Manual (Feb. 8, 2018). https://www.nilc.org/issues/economic-support/
141

public-charge-changes-to-fam/.
142

9 FAM 302.8-2(B)(2)(a)(1).
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Foreign Affairs Manual also used that language in FAM 302.8-2(B) where
it informed consular officers to accept the Form I-864 as satisfying the
public charge analysis and not to question the credibility of the sponsor
“unless there are significant public charge concerns relating to the
specific case, such as if the applicant is of advanced age or has a serious
medical condition.” Now, 9 FAM 302.8-2(B)(3), as revised provides that a
“properly filed and sufficient, non-fraudulent” Affidavit of Support by
itself may not satisfy INA 212(a)(4)’s public charge requirement. A
properly filed and sufficient Affidavit of Support remains essential, but it
does not preclude denial on public charge grounds. Officers now must
consider these affidavits as one factor in the totality of the applicant’s
circumstances.
Finally, the revisions also change how embassy and consulate staff
consider the use of public benefits by family members. The new
instructions allow State Department officials to consider whether an
applicant’s family member has received pubic benefits as part of the
public charge determination. This factor can be overcome “if the
applicant can demonstrate that their prospective income and assets and
the income and assets of others in the family are sufficient to support the
143
family at 125% FPL.”
Recall that these changes cannot affect the public charge
determination for people already residing in the United States who are
seeking to adjust to lawful permanent resident status since that
determination is made not by the State Department, but by USCIS. And
since public charge does not apply to legal immigrants seeking U.S.
citizenship, these instructions cannot apply to lawful permanent residents
seeking to naturalize. Rather, these changes to the Foreign Affairs
Manual only impact non-citizens seeking admission to the United States
via consular processing in their home country.
However, the revisions to the Foreign Affairs Manual may anticipate
coming changes to the federal regulations that govern public charge
analysis in both admissibility and deportability determinations. As
discussed below, the Foreign Affairs Manual changes track to the leaked
notice of proposed rulemaking from the Department of Homeland
144
Security.
iii. The Leaked Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
The Department of Homeland Security has notified the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) that it will propose regulations on
“public charge” provisions of immigration law through a Notice of
143

Nat’l Immig. L. Ctr., Changes to “Public Charge” Instructions in the U.S.
State Department’s Manual (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.nilc.org/issues/economicsupport/public-charge-changes-to-fam/.
144
Draft NPRM at 53–90 (covering much the same ground as the FAM changes,
but in greater detail).
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Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). Homeland Security’s notice to OMB
indicates that the NPRM will be published later in 2018. On February 8,
2018, media outlets began reporting on and published a leaked copy of
146
the draft NPRM. On March 28, 2018, the Washington Post published a
147
more recent draft of the NPRM with a preamble to the proposed rule.
The Washington Post reported that, according to “a person with
knowledge of the deliberations,” “the draft [NPRM] is essentially
complete and awaiting final approval by Homeland Security Secretary
148
Kirstjen Nielsen.”
The draft NPRM the Washington Post obtained would create a new
definition of public benefits in public charge determinations. The
proposed regulation would include but not be limited to: a) SSI, b)
TANF, c) State or local cash benefit programs (i.e. General Assistance),
d) “[a]ny other Federal public benefits for purposes of maintaining the
applicant’s income,” e) nonemergency Medicaid benefits, f) subsidized
healthcare, g) SNAP, h) WIC, i) CHIP, j) housing assistance under the
McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act or the Housing Choice
Voucher Program (i.e. Section 8), k) means-tested energy benefits such
as the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP), (l)
institutionalization for both long-term and short-term care at
government expense, m) the earned income tax credit (EITC) and
similar refundable tax credits, when the credit exceeds the alien’s tax
liability; and n) “[a]ny other public benefit, as described in § 212.21
149
except for those public benefits described in 8 CFR 212.24.” In effect,

145

Inadmissibility and Deportability of Public Charge Grounds, Exec. Office of the
President (2017), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=
201710&RIN=1615-AA22.
146
Dara Lind, Exclusive: Trump’s Draft Plan to Punish Legal Immigrants for Sending
US-Born Kids to Head Start, Vox (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/2/
8/16993172/trump-regulation-immigrants-benefits-public-charge; Yeganeh Torbati,
Exclusive: Trump Administration May Target Immigrants Who Use Food Aid, Other Benefits,
Reuters (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-servicesexclusive/exclusive-trump-administration-may-target-immigrants-who-use-food-aid-otherbenefits-idUSKBN1FS2ZK.
147

Nick Miroff, Trump Proposal Would Penalize Immigrants who Use Tax
Credits and Other Benefits, Wash. Post (March 28, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-proposal-would-penalize-immigrantswho-use-tax-credits-and-other-benefits/2018/03/28/4c6392e0-2924-11e8-bc72077aa4dab9ef_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.fbb3cb25a51f
148

Id.
Draft NPRM at 210–11 (proposed 8 C.F.R. § 212.23). The benefits excluded
from this new definition are a) Social Security’s Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability
Insurance (OASDI) benefits, b) veteran’s benefits, c) government pension benefits,
d) government employee health insurance, e) government employee transportation
benefits, f) unemployment insurance, g) worker’s compensation, h) Medicare
benefits, (“unless the premiums are partially or fully paid by a government agency”),
i) state disability insurance, j) government loans, k) in-state college tuition and any
149
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the draft NPRM would expand the definition of public benefits in public
charge determinations to nearly every federal (and many state) meanstested benefits with the exception of Head Start.
The draft NPRM also identifies the “primarily dependent on the
government” standard as “[o]ne of the principal problems with the
150
current definition of public charge.” In the NPRM, DHS rejects the
primary dependence standard in which the immigration official must
find “an applicant for admission or adjustment of status is 50% or more
151
dependent on the government.”
Instead, relying on dictionary
definitions and a skimpy and selective reading of legislative history and
caselaw, DHS asserts that “a public charge is one who is supported at
152
public expense, i.e., one who uses or receives public benefits.”
Conflating public benefit use with dependence is not new to federal law.
In addition to expanding the definition of public benefits to include
more programs and mere use, the draft NPRM expands it still further by
encompassing use of public benefits by family members “includ[ing], but
not limited to the alien’s spouse, parent, child, legal ward or person who
153
is under a legal guardianship.” DHS maintains that “[t]hese types of
relationships between the alien and other people are relevant to [its]
consideration of the alien’s assets, resources, and financial status, and
154
frequently family status as well.” Considering the number of citizen
children and the number of legal immigrant children who access public
benefits in the United States, this proposed regulatory provision could
155
drastically expand public charge liability.
The draft NPRM also identifies “factors that DHS has determined
156
will generally weigh heavily in a public charge determination.” DHS
enumerates several “heavily weighed negative factors,” such as whether
the individual “is currently using or receiving one or more public
benefits,” “has used or received one or more public benefits within the
last 36 months,” or “has a medical condition and is unable to show
evidence of unsubsidized health insurance” or some other means to pay

subsidized or unsubsidized government student loans, l) Head Start, m) benefits
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, and n) non-refundable tax
credits, and refundable tax credits that are neither means- tested nor intended to
help the individual beneficiary meet basic living.
150
Draft NPRM at 42.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 42–43.
153
Id. at 44.
154
Id. at 45.
155
Samantha Artiga and Anthony Damico, Nearly 20 Million Children Live in
Immigrant Families that Could Be Affected by Evolving Immigration Policies, Kaiser Fam.
Found. (April 18, 2018).
156
Id. at 208.
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for treatment. The only two “heavily weighed positive factors” are if the
individual “has financial assets, resources, and support of at least 250[%
158
FPL]” or income from employment at the same level.
iv. An Initial Appraisal of the Leaked and Proposed Changes
What will happen if President Trump signs the public charge
executive order or the Department of Homeland Security publishes the
NPRM and eventually promulgates new regulations? While a signed
executive order would mark a major departure from settled public
charge doctrine, there are reasons to be skeptical of its practical effect, at
least immediately. Much of the action ordered by the President,
including the almost all-encompassing definition of public benefits,
would require notice and comment rulemaking under the Administrative
159
Procedure Act. That is why the NPRM is more likely to alter public
charge doctrine than a signed executive order would.
Second, a signed executive order would not alter the fact that public
charge determinations involve a totality of the circumstances test that the
President cannot alter. Unlike a conviction for welfare fraud (or any
federal felony conviction, for that matter), mere use of a welfare program
does not guarantee inadmissibility or deportability. Congress has laid out
the other factors that immigration judges must consider.
Even if the Department of Homeland Security promulgated an
expanded definition of public benefits, fewer immigrants would
experience expanded liability than one might think. Federal statutes
exempt some immigrants from public charge considerations (and the
draft NPRM acknowledges these exemptions): Refugees, asylees, survivors
of trafficking and other serious crimes, VAWA-petitioners, individuals
with special immigrant juvenile status, and several other categories of
160
noncitizens. Others do not qualify for public benefits during their first
five years in the country—the same period of time contemplated in the
161
public charge “look back.” Indeed, the fact that most immigrants are
162
subject to the “five-year bar” was lost on the President and his advisers.
157
158
159
160
161

Id. 212.22(c)(1)(ii)–(iii).
Id. 212.22(c)(2(i)–(ii).
5 U.S.C § 553(c) (2012).
See Draft NPRM at 38–41.
Memorandum from Andrew Bremberg to President Trump, supra note 133, at

4.
162

In a June 21, 2017 speech in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, President Trump said, “The
time has come for new immigration rules which say that those seeking admission into
our country must be able to support themselves financially and should not use
welfare for a period of at least five years,” and that he would propose legislation “very
shortly.” Miriam Valverde, Trump Says ‘Time Has Come’ for Law Restricting Federal
Assistance to Immigrants. It Already Exists, PolitiFact (June 27, 2017), http://
www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2017/jun/27/trump-says-time-has-comeimmigration-law-barring-i/. But see PRWORA, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 403(a), 110 Stat.
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Perhaps the greatest challenge to implementing such an executive
order is sheer practicality. Despite build-ups in personnel, Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) simply does not have the agents to
methodically apprehend and detain millions of public benefits
163
recipients. Even with more personnel, it is not clear that ICE offices or
agents in the field would prioritize apprehending law-abiding residents
over other populations.
This reality returns us to the odd feature of public charge as a focus
of concern for the Trump Administration. Public charge doctrine in
deportations only applies to in-status immigrants who are seeking to
adjust to lawful permanent residency. As a legal matter, public charge has
nothing to do with undocumented individuals. Rather, it is one factor in
the determination of whether an individual should be permitted to
164
obtain LPR status. In other words, it is hard to imagine how ICE could
prioritize this population given this administration’s purported priorities.
Relatedly, federal immigration enforcement authorities would most
likely need the cooperation of state governments, the custodians of much
of the information on public benefits recipients, regardless of citizenship
status. As laid out in Part I, many public benefit programs in the United
States have cooperative design features where the federal and state
governments jointly administer the program. In the case of Medicaid and
SNAP, those programs heavily involve both federal and state
governments. TANF is almost entirely state-run; SSI is almost entirely
federal. While some of this data is reported in bulk and in individualized
form to the federal government, from a law enforcement perspective, the
data itself may not be the most useful. Moreover, most public benefits are
not considered debts requiring repayment unless the individual receiving
2105, 2265 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1612 (2000)). The inaccuracy of this statement was
not lost on journalists. See, e.g., Robert Farley et al., Fact Check: Trump Makes Misleading
Claims at Iowa Rally, USA Today (June 23, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/politics/2017/06/23/fact-check-trump-makes-misleading-claims-iowa-rally/
103131784/; Linda Qui, In One Rally, 12 Inaccurate Claims from Trump, N.Y. Times
(June 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/22/us/politics/factcheck-donaldtrump-iowa-rally.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=8C19E035F46705EC8CBEB4752B4
31E01&gwt=pay; Ali Vitali, Trump: Immigrants Should Not Get Welfare for at Least Five
Years, NBC News (June 21, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/
trump-immigrants-should-not-get-welfare-least-five-years-n775336; Mallory Shelbourne,

Trump Wants to Keep New Immigrants from Getting Welfare—Which Is Already the Law, The
Hill (June 21, 2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/338901-trumpssuggests-creating-law-that-has-been-enacted-since-1996.
163
See, e.g., Lisa Rein, Trump Plan to Hire 15,000 Border and Immigration Personnel
Isn’t Justified, Federal Watchdog Says, Wash. Post, (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-plan-to-hire-15000-border-and-immigrationpersonnel-isnt-justified-federal-watchdog-says/2017/08/02/c9345136-77a1-11e7-8839ec48ec4cae25_story.html?utm_term=.0f5b3341dcc8.
164
For admissibility, the public charge determination is one factor in whether to
allow an individual to enter the United States.
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the benefits is a sponsored immigrant. The federal government would
need state governments’ cooperation to pursue recipients and their
sponsors. In Part III, I discuss how complicated procuring that data from
state governments could be.
On the other hand, in some ways, this draft Executive Order has
166
already had an impact. The leaked draft Executive Order on public
charge, along with numerous other Trump Administration news relating
to immigration, has been heavily covered in the media. Among advocates
and service providers, there is concern that immigrant families who are
in-status and legally eligible for public benefits are withdrawing from
these programs out of concern that it increases their exposure to
167
immigration enforcement. And if the proposed regulations in the draft
NPRM become law and are not successfully challenged in federal court,
public charge doctrine could fundamentally reshape how we provide
basic services in the United States, not just to immigrants, but to citizens
who happen to have foreign-born parents.
III. IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND PUBLIC BENEFITS DATA
Another emerging area of concern for immigrant communities is to
what extent the federal government can use data gathered to administer
public benefits programs to pursue immigration enforcement actions.
Advocates for immigrant communities have related this concern from
immigrant families. In my own practice in Chicago, my legal aid
organization received requests from healthcare providers, food pantries,
and community-based organizations regarding what legal constraints, if
any, prevent ICE from requesting public benefits data from state
agencies.
Once again, this potential repurposing of public benefits data for
immigration enforcement reflects the reality of mixed-status families.
Immigrants and their families have expressed concern that
undocumented adults who have enrolled their in-status and/or citizen
165

Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge
Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,690, 28,691 (Mar. 26, 1999).
166
Emily Baumgaertner, Spooked by Trump Proposals, Immigrants Abandon Public
Nutrition Services, N.Y. Times (March 6, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/
06/us/politics/trump-immigrants-public-nutrition-services.html; Kristina Johnson, In
Trump Era, the Long Fight Against Hunger Is Even Tougher, KQED (Nov. 14, 2017),
https://ww2.kqed.org/bayareabites/2017/11/14/in-trump-era-the-long-fight-againsthunger-is-even-tougher/ (recounting that “[s]ome people are afraid that, by signing
up, they will be added to a national database and tracked down by immigration
services if they or someone in their family is undocumented” and how “[m]any also
fear that by receiving food assistance they would count as a ‘public charge,’ and thus
be disqualified [from] citizenship”).
167
Artiga & Damico, supra note 155; Wendy E. Parmet and Elizabeth Ryan, New
Dangers For Immigrants And The Health Care System, Health Affairs (April 20, 2018).

LCB_22_2_Article_6_Hammond (Do Not Delete)

530

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

8/28/2018 9:21 AM

[Vol. 22:2

family members in public benefits could have increased exposure to
federal immigrant authorities.
As we will see, there are some protections in federal law that prevent
federal and state officials from turning over individualized public
benefits data to federal immigration authorities. However, these
protections vary across programs.
A. The Confidentiality of Public Benefits Data
Federal law prohibits federal, state, or local government officials
from restricting the transmission of certain information to immigration
168
authorities. Federal law also contains a similar provision that similarly
169
restricts it to state and local governments.
In a different context from public benefits, the U.S. Department of
Commerce grappled with how these two statutory provisions interact with
13 U.S.C. § 9(a), which prohibits Commerce from disclosing census
170
information. In a general counsel memorandum opinion, Commerce
concluded that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 1644 “displace conflicting state or
local non-disclosure laws, even if they have been enacted by statute or
171
ordinance.” As applied to federal agencies, those statutes, Commerce
168

Specifically, 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2012) states,

Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a Federal,
State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way
restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or
immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.

Note that, with the passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) ceased to exist and most of its functions were
transferred to three new entities: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS),
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP). U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Overview of INS
History 11 (2012). Many of the statutes and regulations refer to INS.
169
8 U.S.C. § 1644 states, “Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State,
or local law, no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way
restricted, from sending to or receiving from the Immigration and Naturalization
Service information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien
in the United States.”
170
Memorandum Opinion from Randolph D. Moss, Acting Assistant Attorney
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to General Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce 1, 5
(May 18, 1999). Section 9(a) reads:
No department, bureau, agency, officer, or employee of the Government, except
the Secretary in carrying out the purposes of this title, shall require, for any
reason, copies of census reports which have been retained by any such
establishment or individual. Copies of census reports which have been so
retained shall be immune from legal process, and shall not, without the consent
of the individual or establishment concerned, be admitted as evidence or used
for any purpose in any action, suit, or other judicial or administrative
proceeding.
171

Id. at 7.
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reasoned, also “may be comfortably construed to limit the discretionary
authority of federal officers or employees, or federal entities like
administrative agencies, to adopt disclosure prohibitions or restrictions;
federal officials or entities generally may exercise discretionary authority
172
of this sort only to the extent that Congress allows by statute.” However,
Commerce did not go so far as to conclude that either statute manifested
a clear enough congressional intent to override the disclosure
173
restrictions in 13 U.S.C. § 9(a) or other federal statutes. Commerce
noted that “‘repeals by implication are not favored,’” and that federal
statutes should be construed as consistent with each other whenever
174
possible. One federal statute should only be read as repealing a second
federal statute where the first statute explicitly names and repeals the
175
second statute.
The Second Circuit rejected a facial challenge to these federal
176
statutes insofar as they apply to state and local entities. That court
conceded that while “the Tenth Amendment limits the power of
Congress to regulate by directly compelling [states] to enact and enforce
177
a federal regulatory program,” “Congress has plenary power to legislate
178
on the subject of aliens.” Moreover, Congress is not compelling states
and local governments to enact or administer any federal regulatory
program. Rather, these provisions merely prohibit state and local
government entities or officials from directly restricting the exchange of
179
information with federal immigration enforcement officers. The Tenth
Amendment does not provide “an untrammeled right to forbid all
voluntary cooperation by state or local officials with particular federal
180
programs.”
The Privacy Act of 1974 also governs the collection and disclosure of
information about individuals that is maintained in systems of records by
181
any federal agencies. However, the Privacy Act likely does not provide
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181

Id.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 33 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
Id.
5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2012) provides:

No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by
any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except
pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the
individual to whom the record pertains, unless disclosure of the record would
be—(7) to another agency or to an instrumentality of any governmental
jurisdiction within or under the control of the United States for a civil or
criminal law enforcement activity if the activity is authorized by law, and if the
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any protection against disclosure of an undocumented immigrant’s status
182
to immigration enforcement officials.
In 2000, an interagency notice issued by five federal agencies
183
analyzed disclosure requirements in public benefits statutes. According
to the Interagency Notice, agency personnel “know” a person is present
illegally (and therefore are required to disclose to immigration
enforcement agencies) only where (a) the unlawful presence is a finding
of fact or conclusion of law that is made by the agency as part of a formal
determination that is subject to administrative review on an alien’s claim
for benefits under the relevant program, and (b) that finding of fact or
conclusion of unlawful presence is supported by a determination by
184
USCIS, ICE, CBP, or the Executive Office of Immigration Review. The
Interagency Notice notes that a Systematic Alien Verification for
Entitlements (SAVE) response showing no DHS record on an individual
or an immigration status making the individual ineligible for a benefit is
185
not a “determination” for purposes of disclosure.
i. Medicaid Data
Of the major public benefits programs, the federal Medicaid statute
offers arguably the strongest data protections for recipients: “A State plan
for medical assistance must provide safeguards which restrict the use or
disclosure of information concerning applicants and recipients to
186
purposes directly connected with the administration of the plan.”
head of the agency or instrumentality has made a written request to the agency
which maintains the record specifying the particular portion desired and the law
enforcement activity for which the record is sought.
182
Undocumented immigrants do not fall under 5 U.S.C. § 552a’s definition of
“individuals.” For the purposes of the statute, “‘individual’ means a citizen of the
United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” Id. § 552a(a).
The term “‘record’ means any item, collection, or grouping of information about an
individual that is maintained by an agency.” Id. § 552a(a)(4). Even if undocumented
immigrants did qualify as “individuals,” disclosure of their immigration status should
still be permitted under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(7) since ICE, CBP, and the Justice
Department are law enforcement agencies.
183
Responsibility of Certain Entities to Notify the Immigration and
Naturalization Service of Any Alien Who the Entity “Knows” Is Not Lawfully Present
in the United States, 65 Fed. Reg. 58,301 (Sept. 28, 2000). One example of a
disclosure requirement analyzed by the Interagency Notice is TANF’s mandatory
disclosure requirement:

Each State to which a grant is made under section 603 of this title shall, at least 4
times annually and upon request of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
furnish the Immigration and Naturalization Service with the name and address
of, and other identifying information on, any individual who the State knows is
unlawfully in the United States.

42 U.S.C. § 611a, 608(g) (2012).
184
65 Fed. Reg. at 58,302.
185
Id.
186
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(7)(A)(i).
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The restricted information includes information on a “non187
applicant,” which federal regulations define as “an individual who is
not seeking an eligibility determination for himself or herself and is
included in an applicant’s or beneficiary’s household to determine
188
eligibility for such applicant or beneficiary.”
And the federal
regulations are clear that “[t]he agency’s policies must apply to all
requests for information from outside sources, including governmental
189
bodies, the courts, or law enforcement officials.” Furthermore, the state
agency “must obtain permission from a family or individual, whenever
possible, before responding to a request for information from an outside
190
source.”
Purposes directly related to plan administration include (a)
establishing eligibility, (b) determining the amount of medical assistance,
(c) providing services for beneficiaries, and (d) conducting or assisting
an investigation, prosecution, or civil or criminal proceeding related to
191
the administration of the plan. The fourth and final purpose is for
192
enforcement actions for Medicaid fraud.
Furthermore, federal regulations require that “[a] State plan must
provide, under a State statute that imposes legal sanctions, safeguards
meeting the requirements of this subpart that restrict the use or
disclosure of information concerning applicants and beneficiaries to
193
purposes directly connected with the administration of the plan.”
The regulations also provide that an agency may request a nonapplicant’s Social Security number (SSN), provided that the provision of
such SSN is voluntary and the SSN is only used (i) to determine an
applicant’s or beneficiary’s eligibility for Medicaid or other insurance
affordability program or (ii) for a purpose directly connected to the
194
administration of the State plan. Moreover, the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) must establish an electronic service
through which states may verify certain information with other federal
195
agencies, including DHS.
However, HHS has asserted that state
agencies administering Medicaid “may not request information
196
regarding a non-applicant’s citizenship or immigration status.”
Similarly, the Triagency Guidance provides that state agencies will not
187

42 C.F.R. § 431.300(b) (2017).
Id. § 435.4.
189
Id. § 431.306(e).
190
Id. § 431.306(d).
191
Id. § 431.302.
192
Id.
193
Id. § 431.301.
194
Id. § 435.907(e)(3).
195
Id. § 435.949(a).
196
Eligibility Changes Under the Affordable Care Act of 2010, 77 Fed. Reg.
17,144, 17,165 (Mar. 23, 2012).
188
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attempt to determine via DHS the immigration status of non-applicant
197
household members who do not provide their immigration status.
Therefore, under the plain meaning of the federal Medicaid statute,
a federal or state administrator cannot disclose to ICE, CBP, or the
Department of Justice information regarding an applicant or recipient’s
immigration status for the purpose of immigration enforcement because
such a purpose is not directly connected with the administration of the
plan. Furthermore, federal regulations define information concerning an
applicant or recipient as to include information on a non-applicant.
Thus, under this regulation, HHS and the state agencies administering
Medicaid would not be permitted to disclose a non-applicant’s
immigration status to ICE or CBP. ICE itself suggested such a reading in
its October 25, 2013 letter, entitled “Clarification of Existing Practices
Related to Certain Health Care Information,” describing its agency
198
policy.
ii. SNAP Data
Administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, federal law
governing SNAP provides that a state’s plan of operation for the program
must provide safeguards that prohibit the use or disclosure of
information obtained from applicant households except in specifically
199
enumerated circumstances. One of these circumstances is provided in 7
U.S.C. § 2020(e)(15), which says that a state’s plan of operation of SNAP
must provide information to immigration authorities if “any member of a
household is ineligible to receive supplemental nutrition assistance
program benefits because that member is present in the United States in
violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act.”
An adult representative of each household applying for SNAP
benefits must certify in writing that all members of the household who

197
Letter from Olivia Golden, Assistant Sec’y, Admin. for Children & Families, to
State Health and Welfare Officials (July 26, 2013) [hereinafter Letter from Olivia
Golden], https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-individuals/special-topics/needy-families/
triagency-letter/index.html.
198
Consistent with the ACA’s, the SSA’s, and implementing regulations’
limitations on the use of information provided by individuals for such coverage, and
in line with ICE’s operational focus, ICE does not use information about such
individuals or members of their household that is obtained for purposes of
determining eligibility for such coverage as the basis for pursuing a civil immigration
enforcement action against such individuals or members of their household, whether
that information is provided by a federal agency to the Department of Homeland
Security for purposes of verifying immigration status information or whether the
information is provided to ICE by another source.
Clarification of Existing Practices Related to Certain Health Care Information, U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enf’t (Oct. 25, 2013), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/erooutreach/pdf/ice-aca-memo.pdf.
199
7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(8) (2012).
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200

will receive benefits are citizens or are qualified aliens. When a
household indicates inability or unwillingness to provide documentation
of alien status for any household member, the state agency must classify
that member as an ineligible alien. In such cases, the state agency must
201
not continue efforts to obtain that documentation. A classification as
an ineligible alien does not constitute a “determination” for purposes of
202
the SNAP Mandatory Disclosure Requirement.
USDA was not one of the agencies that issued the 2000 Interagency
Notice discussed above, but federal SNAP regulations allow for the
unlawful immigration disclosure requirement to be satisfied by
203
complying with the guidance in the 2000 Interagency Notice.
Although a household member does not have to provide
documentation of alien status to the state agency administering SNAP, if
a household member does provide such documentation, then the state
agency must (i) submit photocopies of the documentation to the
Department of Homeland Security for verification, and (ii) verify the
documentation through the Systematic Alien Verification for
204
Entitlements (SAVE) Program. Under the 2000 Interagency Notice, a
SAVE response showing no DHS record on an individual or an
immigration status making the individual ineligible for benefits is not a
“determination” for purposes of the SNAP Mandatory Disclosure
205
Requirement. The Triagency guidance issued by HHS and USDA in
2000 emphasizes that SNAP agents will not attempt to determine via DHS
the immigration status of non-applicant household members who do not
206
provide their immigration status.
Therefore, while SNAP lacks the statutory prohibitions that govern
the Medicaid program, its mandatory disclosure requirements are limited
by the joint agency guidance and notices issued in 2000 by the relevant
federal agencies.
iii. TANF Data
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
207
oversees state administration of TANF funds. Federal law requires HHS
to disclose an undocumented immigrant’s immigration status where
HHS knows that the immigrant is not lawfully present in the United

200

Id. § 2020(e)(2)(B)(v)(II).
7 C.F.R. § 273.4(b)(2) (2012).
202
7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(15).
203
7 C.F.R. § 273.4(b).
204
Id. § 272.11(d). The SAVE Program is administered by the Department of
Homeland Security. Id. § 272.11(a).
205
See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
206
Letter from Olivia Golden, supra note 181.
207
42 U.S.C. § 616 (2012).
201
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States. HHS was one of the five agencies that issued the Interagency
Notice.
Federal law prohibits HHS from disclosing information except as
208
permitted by other federal law or by regulations promulgated by HHS.
But federal regulations allow TANF administrators to disclose
information without the consent of the individual “[t]o another
government agency or to an instrumentality of any governmental
jurisdiction within or under the control of the United States for a civil or
criminal law enforcement activity if the activity is authorized by law” if the
head of that agency does so in writing and specifies the law enforcement
209
purpose. Since ICE, CBP, and the Department of Justice are law
enforcement agencies and immigration enforcement is a law
enforcement activity, an agency or official would be permitted to disclose
such information to ICE, CBP, or the U.S. Attorney General upon written
request.
That said, TANF administrators are not likely to turn over
information otherwise. Federal law requires that each state that
participates in TANF to furnish ICE or CBP (at least four times annually
and upon request of ICE or CBP) with the name and address of any
210
individual who the state “knows” is unlawfully in the United States.
According to the 2000 Interagency Notice, federal law only requires
disclosure where the relevant individual’s unlawful presence in the U.S. is
a finding of fact or conclusion of law (i) that is made by the agency as
part of a formal determination that is subject to administrative review,
and (ii) that is supported by a determination of USCIS, ICE, CBP, or the
211
Executive Office of Immigration.
iv. SSI Data
As for data on SSI recipients, federal law prohibits the Social Security
Administration (SSA) from disclosing information except as permitted by

208
209

42 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(2).
Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(1) provides:

No disclosure . . . of any such file, record, report, or other paper, or any
information, obtained at any time by any person from the head of the applicable
agency or from any officer or employee of the applicable agency, shall be made
except as the head of the applicable agency may by regulations prescribe and
except as otherwise provided by Federal law.

See also 45 C.F.R. § 5b.9(b) (2017) (providing that HHS may disclose information to
another government agency for a civil or criminal law enforcement activity if the
activity is authorized by law, and if the head of the other government agency submits
a written request to HHS specifying the record desired and the law enforcement
activity for which the record is sought).
210
42 U.S.C. § 611a.
211
Responsibility of Certain Entities to Notify the Immigration and
Naturalization Service of Any Alien Who the Entity “Knows” Is Not Lawfully Present
in the United States, 65 Fed. Reg. 58,302 (Sept. 28, 2000).
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212

other federal law or by regulations promulgated by SSA.
The
implementing regulations of SSA do not appear to permit agency
officials to turn over individualized data for immigration enforcement
purposes. In its implementing regulations, SSA promulgated that “[t]he
Privacy Act allows [SSA] to disclose information if the head of the law
enforcement agency makes a written request giving enough information
to show that the information is needed” if the request involves an
investigation by criminal law enforcement concerning a violent crime or
a fraudulent application for benefits in another social security or public
213
benefits program. Moreover, SSA was also one of the five agencies that
issued the 2000 Interagency Notice, so one would expect SSA to
214
administer the SSI program along the lines discussed above.
B. The Future of Immigration Enforcement and Public Benefits Data
There is no indication the Trump Administration will use public
benefits data as a tool in immigration enforcement. However, the
Executive Order signed on January 25, 2017, and the resulting Sanctuary
Cities litigation suggests that this issue is one about which it may be worth
speculating. The January 25th Executive Order and the legal challenges
suggest that the current administration is interested in using nonimmigration-enforcement agencies at the federal and state level for these
purposes and that certain states and cities will challenge those efforts in
215
federal court. Indeed, the litigation will turn, in part, on the meaning
of 8 U.S.C. § 1373, the same provision discussed earlier in this Part.
Regardless of the outcome of the litigation in Chicago and Santa
Clara, state and local governments can take steps to protect personalized
data and reassure immigrant families to continue to seek basic assistance.
State agencies should not elicit, collect, or store immigration status
information that is not required by federal law. State agencies should not

212

See supra note 194. Note that SSA is defined as one of the applicable agencies.
42 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(2).
213
Specifically, “for criminal law enforcement purposes where a violent crime has
been committed and the individual about whom the information is being sought has
been indicted or convicted of that crime” or “when necessary to investigate or
prosecute criminal activity involving the social security program or in other incomemaintenance or health-maintenance programs if the information concerns eligibility,
benefit amounts, or other matters of benefit status in a social security program and is
relevant to determining the same matters in the other program.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 401.155(a) (2017).
214
65 Fed. Reg. at 58,302.
215
City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 937 (N.D. Ill. 2017); County
of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 508 (N.D. Cal. 2017). See generally Printz
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 898 (1997) (holding that the federal Government
cannot compel a state or local government to administer a federal program or
regulation).
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use information except for purposes directly related to the program or
service. State agencies need to be flexible on forms of proof to capture
income (e.g., allowing self-attestation). State agencies should have and
follow a data retention policy. State agencies should not respond to bulk
requests; administrative subpoenas need to be individualized. The
Attorney General of Massachusetts published guidance for schools and
health care providers regarding immigration enforcement, and the City
216
of San Francisco published client-facing FAQs on this topic. Eventually,
those interested in protecting personalized data of public benefits
recipients would do well to incorporate the Medicaid privacy protections
in other programs.
IV. CONCLUSION
Over the last 20 years, the United States has seen fit to draw
distinctions between citizens and noncitizens for the purposes of public
benefits. This lawmaking has been a bipartisan project, crafted by
Democratic and Republican members in both houses of Congress and
signed into law by multiple Presidents. Similarly, states across the country
have used the provisions of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act to create a
patchwork of rules governing the eligibility of noncitizens for state-run
public benefit programs. The election of Donald Trump to the
Presidency does not change this unsettled era of immigration law and
welfare law.
However, even if President Trump leaves public benefits eligibility
alone, his administration could change the immigration-welfare nexus in
American law in dramatic ways. Some would require Congressional
approval; others would not. Public charge doctrine, while in federal
statute for well over a century, is rarely used in removal proceedings.
Sponsor deeming and seeking reimbursement appears to be even less
common. However, an expansion of public charge liability for the
immigrant and his sponsor could drastically alter how immigrants
interact with public benefit programs, let alone with one another. And
putting public charge doctrine to one side, public benefit data could be
repurposed for immigration enforcement purposes. The proposed
regulations that could be published later this year represent the gravest
threat to medical assistance, food assistance, and disability assistance for
immigrants and their families since the 1996 Welfare Reform Act.
Today, the United States is home to 20 million children who have at
least one immigrant parent. That’s one in four children in America.
Nearly nine in ten (17.7 million) of these children are citizens. If the
Trump Administration’s proposed changes to public charge come to
pass, equal protection for citizens who happen to have foreign-born

216

On file with author.
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parents will cease to be a constitutional commitment—it will be little
217
more than an empty promise.

217

Artiga & Damico, supra note 155.

